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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case we consider the efforts of plaintiff Patricia 
Thompson to hold her former employers responsible for 
alleged overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the New Jersey 
Wage and Hour Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:11-56a – 34:11–
56a38.  Thompson appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted 
the motion of defendants to dismiss each of Thompson’s 
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  For the following reasons, we will vacate and 
remand. 
I. 
In June 2009, appellant Patricia Thompson, a New 
Jersey resident, was hired as a mortgage underwriter by 
defendant Security Atlantic Mortgage Company (“Security 
Atlantic”), a “nationwide direct mortgage lender.”1  App. 23.  
Shortly thereafter, however, she was assigned to a training 
class led by a representative for a different mortgage 
company, defendant Real Estate Mortgage Network 
(“REMN”).  That employee “represented that REMN was a 
sister company of Security Atlantic.”  App. 93. 
                                              
1
 Our recitation of the factual background of this 
appeal is derived from Thompson’s Amended Complaint.  
For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true all facts set 
forth in the Amended Complaint, and draw all reasonable 
inferences from such allegations in favor of the complainant.  
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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In February 2010, allegedly in response to an 
investigation being conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) into Security 
Atlantic’s mortgage practices, Thompson and many of her 
colleagues were asked by supervisors to fill out new job 
applications to work for REMN.  Thompson completed the 
application as requested.  From roughly that date forward, 
Thompson’s paychecks were issued by REMN instead of 
Security Atlantic.  Defendants characterize Security Atlantic, 
which is no longer in business, as “defunct.”2 
Despite Thompson’s transfer to REMN, virtually no 
change occurred in on-site operations.  Thompson and her 
colleagues continued to do the same work, at the same desks, 
at the same location.  Thompson’s pay rate, work email 
address, and direct supervisors remained the same.  
Thompson alleges that no employees were laid off during this 
transition, although some of her colleagues continued to 
receive paychecks from Security Atlantic. 
The basis for this lawsuit against both Security 
Atlantic and REMN is Thompson’s allegation that between 
June 2009 and the end of her employment with REMN on 
August 5, 2010: 
[D]efendants suffered and 
permitted plaintiff and other 
underwriters, closers and HUD 
reviewers to regularly work more 
                                              
2
 Because that representation was made in defendants’ 
motion papers before the District Court, App. 42, we treat it 
as a judicial admission.  See Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 
455 F.3d 195, 211 n.20 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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than eight hours per day and more 
than forty hours per week without 
overtime compensation for all 
overtime hours worked.  
Employees [were] given 
turnaround times for assignments 
and employees routinely worked 
through lunch and at home to 
meet these requirements. 
App. 99.  Thompson also alleges that “[d]efendants uniformly 
misrepresented to plaintiff and other mortgage underwriters, 
closers and HUD reviewers that they were exempt, salaried 
employees and, therefore, ineligible to receive overtime pay.”  
App. 101.  The misconduct was allegedly “widespread, 
repeated and consistent.”  Id. 
Aside from her claims against Security Atlantic and 
REMN, Thompson also seeks relief from defendants Samuel 
Lamparello (the co-owner and President of Security Atlantic) 
and Noel Chapman (the co-owner and Executive Vice 
President of Security Atlantic).  The Amended Complaint 
alleges that throughout the time periods at issue, Chapman 
and Lamparello “made decisions concerning [Security 
Atlantic’s] and REMN’s day-to-day operations, hiring, firing, 
promotions, personnel matters, work schedules, pay policies, 
and compensation.”  App. 93.  When a work or personnel 
issue arose at Security Atlantic or REMN that Thompson’s 
immediate supervisor could not address alone, “the supervisor 
would consult with, among others, Chapman or Lamparello.”  
Id. 
In June 2010, Thompson directly asked Chapman 
about overtime compensation.  He responded that he “did not 
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pay overtime to underwriters.”  App. 99.  In July 2010, 
Chapman sent an email to “All Departments” stating, in part, 
“So many of you worked long hours, late nights and even 
weekends to make sure that all REMN customers are happy 
customers.”  App. 92.  Thompson quit her job at REMN on 
August 5, 2010.  In 2011, both Chapman and Lamparello 
became officers of REMN. 
Thompson filed her “class and collective action” 
complaint on March 16, 2011.
3
  On December 30, 2011, the 
District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for 
failure to state a claim.  
Thompson filed her Amended Complaint on January 
27, 2012.  She asserts that all four defendants violated the 
FLSA by “failing to properly compensate plaintiff, failing to 
pay plaintiff overtime pay for time worked in excess of 40 
hours in a workweek, and misclassifying plaintiff as exempt 
from the overtime wage requirements of the FLSA.”  App. 
95.  Thompson further seeks to hold REMN liable for 
SAMC’s own statutory violations under theories of joint 
liability and successor liability.  She also contends that 
Chapman and Lamparello were her “employer[s] and/or joint 
employer[s]” by virtue of their positions with the defendant 
companies, and therefore are “personally, jointly and 
severally liable for the violations of the FLSA and the [New 
Jersey Wage and Hour Law] by [Security Atlantic] and 
REMN.”  App. 92–93. 
                                              
3
 Because the subject of this appeal is the District 
Court’s dismissal of Thompson’s personal claims for relief, 
we do not address Thompson’s “class and collective action” 
claims in any way. 
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On August 31, 2012, the District Court dismissed 
without prejudice the entirety of Thompson’s Amended 
Complaint.  Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal and has 
not sought leave to file a second amended complaint. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a 
district court’s dismissal without prejudice where, as here, the 
plaintiff elects to stand on the dismissed complaint without 
further amendment.  Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2009).
4
  Our review of a District Court’s dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under the “notice pleading” 
standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”  As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” 
claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the 
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Although “[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a 
plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
the necessary element.”  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int’l 
Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117–18 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). 
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III. 
A. 
The FLSA and its state-law counterpart, the New 
Jersey Wage and Hour Law, allow employees to sue their past 
or present employers for various employment-related causes 
of action.  Like the District Court and parties, we will 
distinguish between Thompson’s federal-law claims and 
state-law claims only as necessary. 
Relevant here, the FLSA provides: 
[N]o employer shall employ any 
of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in 
commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, or is 
employed in an enterprise 
engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek longer 
than forty hours unless such 
employee receives compensation 
for his employment in excess of 
the hours above specified at a rate 
not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he 
is employed. 
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29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
5
  For employees who have been 
wrongly denied overtime pay, the FLSA offers a private 
cause of action to recover the corpus of the unpaid 
compensation along with equivalent liquidated damages, 
costs, and attorney’s fees.  Id. § 216(b). 
Our first inquiry in most FLSA cases is whether the 
plaintiff has alleged an actionable employer-employee 
relationship.  An “employer” is “any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee . . . .”  Id. § 203(d).  An “employee” is “any 
individual employed by an employer.”  Id. § 203(e)(1).  To 
“employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.”  Id. § 203(g).  
As we have recently recognized, the breadth of these 
definitions is both intentional and obvious: 
When determining whether 
someone is an employee under the 
FLSA, “economic reality rather 
than technical concepts is to be 
the test of employment.”  Under 
this theory, the FLSA defines 
employer “expansively,” and with 
“striking breadth.”  The Supreme 
Court has even gone so far as to 
acknowledge that the FLSA's 
definition of an employer is “the 
                                              
5
 The language of New Jersey Wage and Hour Law § 
34:11-56a4 is substantially similar to the FLSA, and provides: 
“Each employer shall pay to each of his employees . . . 1 1/2 
times such employee’s regular hourly wage for each hour of 
working time in excess of 40 hours in any week[.]”  § 34:11-
56a4. 
10 
 
broadest definition that has ever 
been included in any one act.” 
In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Prac. 
Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted). 
Thompson first challenges the District Court’s 
dismissal of her most straightforward claims, i.e., that (1) 
Security Atlantic committed statutory violations by failing to 
compensate Thompson appropriately between her date of 
hiring in June 2009 and her transfer to REMN in February 
2010, and (2) REMN committed entirely separate statutory 
violations by failing to compensate Thompson appropriately 
between her date of hiring in February 2010 and the 
conclusion of her employment in July 2010.  The District 
Court did not explain its reasoning for dismissal of these 
claims.  Nor did defendants below mount a serious argument 
for such dismissal.  Accordingly, we are left without the 
benefit of an articulated legal basis for the District Court’s 
ruling.  Defendants now attempt to justify the dismissal of 
these claims by arguing that Thompson’s allegations 
improperly “group[] all defendants—individual and 
corporate—together and fail[] to differentiate between them 
as to alleged wrongful conduct.”  Appellees’ Br. at 20.   
The pleadings here put the corporate defendants on fair 
notice that the alleged violations began during Thompson’s 
employment with Security Atlantic and persisted throughout 
her relatively brief tenure with the two companies.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of 
Thompson’s claims against Security Atlantic and REMN 
under a theory of primary liability. 
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B. 
Thompson also appeals from the District Court’s 
dismissal of her claims insofar as they depend on a theory of 
joint employment between Security Atlantic and REMN.  
Under the FLSA, multiple persons or entities can be 
responsible for a single employee’s wages as “joint 
employers” in certain situations.  29 C.F.R. § 791.2.  One 
such scenario occurs where both employers “exert significant 
control” over the employee, N.L.R.B. v. Browning–Ferris 
Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1982), “by 
reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, 
or is under common control with  the other employer.”  29 
C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3).  Under these circumstances, each joint 
employer may be held jointly and severally liable for the 
FLSA violations of the other, in addition to direct liability for 
its own violations. 
We have recently treated this topic in some depth, see 
In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 467–71, and in so doing 
announced a directive that we described as the “Enterprise 
test.” 6   When assessing whether a “joint employer” 
                                              
6
 Defendants suggest that Thompson’s failure to cite 
Enterprise in the District Court, and the District Court’s 
subsequent omission of that precedent from its opinion of 
August 31, 2012, precludes Thompson from benefitting from 
it now.  The Enterprise decision, however, does not constitute 
a “claim” requiring presentation to the District Court. See Yee 
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) (“Once a 
federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any 
argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to 
the precise arguments they made below.”).  Thompson’s 
“joint employer” claims were well established in the record.  
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relationship exists, a court should consider the following non-
exhaustive list of relevant factors:  
(1) the alleged employer’s 
authority to hire and fire the 
relevant employees; (2) the 
alleged employer’s authority to 
promulgate work rules and 
assignments and to set the 
employees’ conditions of 
employment: compensation, 
benefits, and work schedules, 
including the rate and method of 
payment; (3) the alleged 
employer’s involvement in day-
to-day employee supervision, 
including employee discipline; 
and (4) the alleged employer’s 
actual control of employee 
records, such as payroll, 
insurance, or taxes. 
Id. at 469.  As with the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship in the first instance, however, the determination 
depends on “all the facts in the particular case.”  29 C.F.R. § 
791.2(a). 
Here, the District Court emphasized that Thompson’s 
employment by Security Atlantic was separate and distinct 
from her employment by REMN.  This may be correct if one 
                                                                                                     
We would be remiss if we failed to apply our own binding 
precedent simply because it was not cited before the District 
Court.  
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considers only the name of the payor appearing on 
Thompson’s pay stubs.  But Thompson alleges more.  The 
Amended Complaint states that an employee of REMN 
conducted Thompson’s training immediately after she was 
hired by Security Atlantic in June 2009, indicating that 
REMN had at least some authority to “promulgate work rules 
and assignments” even before REMN formally hired 
Thompson in February 2010.  The employee responsible for 
Thompson’s training allegedly described REMN as Security 
Atlantic’s “sister company,” a term which suggests some 
broader degree of corporate intermingling.  And the scenario 
described by Thompson, in which she and virtually all other 
Security Atlantic employees were abruptly and seamlessly 
integrated into REMN’s commercial mortgage business while 
some of those same employees continued to be paid by 
Security Atlantic, supports Thompson’s claim that the two 
companies shared authority over hiring and firing practices.  
We caution that our assessment rests heavily on the 
procedural posture of this litigation.  Thompson, a low-level 
employee with each of the defendant companies, has had no 
opportunity for discovery as to payroll and taxation 
documents, disciplinary records, internal corporate 
communications, or leadership and ownership structures.  It 
may well be that a fully developed factual record will 
preclude a finding that Security Atlantic and REMN were 
“joint employers” of Thompson for any of the pay periods at 
issue.  But under these circumstances, we cannot say that 
Thompson’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  We will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims in this regard and 
remand for further proceedings. 
C. 
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Thompson alternatively seeks to hold REMN liable for 
Security Atlantic’s alleged violations not only on a joint 
employer theory, but also on the theory that REMN, as an 
alleged successor in interest to Security Atlantic, is obligated 
to assume that company’s debts and liabilities.  The parties 
dispute which law, state or federal, governs Thompson’s 
FLSA successor liability claims.
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Defendants urge that we apply New Jersey law, which 
holds that successor corporations are legally distinct from 
their predecessors and do not assume any of the debts or 
liabilities of the prior entity, except where: 
                                              
7
 Defendants argue that Thompson waived the 
opportunity to rely on federal common law by failing to raise 
the issue of its applicability before the District Court.   The 
prudential rule that we not consider claims raised for the first 
time on appeal is at its strongest when a party presents an 
issue for the first time on appeal and thereby prevents the 
opposing party from introducing evidence relevant to that 
issue.  See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 
(3d Cir. 1994).  In this case, the proceedings remain at the 
pleadings stage.  Neither party has introduced evidence of any 
kind.  Nor is it a surprise to defendants on appeal that 
Thompson seeks relief on a theory of successor liability.  
Because we consider it extremely unlikely that our de novo 
analysis would be materially affected if that question had 
been presented squarely at an earlier juncture, and because 
the question of the law applicable to a claim predicated upon 
successor liability under the FLSA is an open and important 
question in this Circuit, we decline to hold that Thompson’s 
failure to raise the issue effected a waiver in this instance. 
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(1) the purchasing corporation 
expressly or impliedly agreed to 
assume such debts and liabilities; 
(2) the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the 
seller and purchaser; (3) the 
purchasing corporation is merely 
a continuation of the selling 
corporation, or (4) the transaction 
is entered into fraudulently in 
order to escape responsibility for 
such debts and liabilities. 
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 
1981).  Here, Thompson claims that REMN is a “mere 
continuation” of Security Atlantic, and is therefore 
accountable for its legal liabilities.  We have previously 
summarized New Jersey law pertaining to the “mere 
continuation” rule as follows: 
Factors relevant to the “mere 
continuation” exception include 
continuity of ownership; 
continuity of management; 
continuity of personnel; 
continuity of physical location, 
assets and general business 
operations; and cessation of the 
prior business shortly after the 
new entity is formed.  Also 
relevant is the extent to which the 
successor intended “to incorporate 
[the predecessor] into its system 
with as much the same structure 
16 
 
and operation as possible.”  Thus 
the court should determine 
whether “the purchaser holds 
itself out to the world as the 
effective continuation of the 
seller.”  However, the proponent 
of successor liability need not 
necessarily establish all of these 
factors. 
Marshak v. Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 490 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Bowen Engineering v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 
467, 487–88 (D.N.J. 1992)).  
 Thompson urges that, as to her FLSA claim, we apply 
a federal common law standard for successor liability that has 
slowly gained traction in the field of labor and employment 
disputes over the course of almost fifty years.  That standard, 
which presents a lower bar to relief than most state 
jurisprudence, was designed to “impos[e] liability upon 
successors beyond the confines of the common law rule when 
necessary to protect important employment-related 
policies[,]” Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 
89, 94 (3d Cir. 2011), and dictates consideration of only the 
following factors: “(1) continuity in operations and work 
force of the successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice 
to the successor-employer of its predecessor’s legal 
obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide 
adequate relief directly.”  Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician 
Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Rego 
v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 F.3d 396, 402 (3d 
Cir. 1999)). 
17 
 
The Supreme Court crafted the federal common law 
standard in the context of a claim under the Labor 
Management Relations Act, see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548–51 (1964), and later applied 
the standard to claims under the National Labor Relations 
Act.  See Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 
181–85 (1973).  In the past decade we have further extended 
the federal standard to claims brought under Title VII, see 
Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177–79, and ERISA, see Einhorn, 
632 F.3d at 93–99.   
 Two of our sister circuits have addressed the merits of 
this issue and concluded that application of the federal 
standard to claims under the FLSA is the logical extension of 
existing case law.  See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power 
Solutions, 711 F.3d 763, 765–77 (7th Cir. 2013); Steinbach v. 
Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).  We agree.  In 
Teed, Judge Posner, writing for the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, stated the following case for the ongoing 
vitality of the standard itself and for its applicability to claims 
under the FLSA: 
The idea behind having a 
distinct federal standard 
applicable to federal labor and 
employment statutes is that these 
statutes are intended either to 
foster labor peace, as in the 
National Labor Relations Act, or 
to protect workers' rights, as in 
Title VII, and that in either type of 
case the imposition of successor 
liability will often be necessary to 
achieve the statutory goals 
18 
 
because the workers will often be 
unable to head off a corporate sale 
by their employer aimed at 
extinguishing the employer's 
liability to them.  This logic 
extends to suits to enforce the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.  “The FLSA 
was passed to protect workers' 
standards of living through the 
regulation of working conditions.  
29 U.S.C. § 202.  That 
fundamental purpose is as fully 
deserving of protection as the 
labor peace, anti-discrimination, 
and worker security policies 
underlying the NLRA, Title VII, 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, ERISA, and 
MPPAA.”  Steinbach v. Hubbard, 
51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).  
In the absence of successor 
liability, a violator of the Act 
could escape liability, or at least 
make relief much more difficult to 
obtain, by selling its assets 
without an assumption of 
liabilities by the buyer (for such 
an assumption would reduce the 
purchase price by imposing a cost 
on the buyer) and then dissolving.  
And although it can be argued that 
imposing successor liability in 
such a case impedes the operation 
of the market in companies by 
19 
 
increasing the cost to the buyer of 
a company that may have violated 
the FLSA, it's not a strong 
argument.  The successor will 
have been compensated for 
bearing the liabilities by paying 
less for the assets it's buying; it 
will have paid less because the net 
value of the assets will have been 
diminished by the associated 
liabilities. 
. . . 
Thomas & Betts argues 
that the Act imposes liability only 
on “employers,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 
203(d), 216(b), and Thomas & 
Betts was not the employer of the 
suing workers when the Act was 
violated.  But that is equally true 
when successor liability is 
imposed in a Title VII case, as the 
case law requires.  It argues that 
Wisconsin has an interest in this 
case because it too has minimum 
wage and overtime laws.  But 
states also have their own laws, 
paralleling Title VII, forbidding 
employment discrimination.  It 
points out that most FLSA suits 
are brought by individuals for the 
recovery of individual damages 
rather than by the government 
20 
 
(though in fact the Department of 
Labor brings many), but likewise 
most Title VII suits are private 
rather than public.  It argues that 
violations of the FLSA are 
“victimless,” because no one is 
compelled to work for a company 
that violates that Act.  Neither is 
anyone forced to work for a 
company that discriminates on 
grounds forbidden by Title VII, 
such as race and sex.  Yet there 
are victims of the violations in 
both FLSA and Title VII cases—
workers who would be paid 
higher wages if their employer 
complied with the FLSA and 
workers who would have better 
jobs and working conditions if 
their employer complied with 
Title VII.  Moreover, there is an 
interest in legal predictability that 
is served by applying the same 
standard of successor liability . . . 
to all federal statutes that protect 
employees . . . . 
Id. at 766-67. 
We find that pronouncement well reasoned, directly 
applicable, and in accord with our own jurisprudence.
8
  
                                              
8
 Indeed, this case mirrors Einhorn, in which we 
declared that “[i]n light of the Seventh Circuit's 
21 
 
Moreover, defendants provide no compelling reason why the 
federal common law standard should not be applied, as in 
Brzozowski and Einhorn, to this employment-related claim 
arising under a broad and worker-friendly federal statute.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 202. 
The issue remains as to whether Thompson’s 
allegations satisfy the federal common law standard in the 
case at hand.  Here, the District Court concluded that the 
Amended Complaint, with respect to successor liability, 
alleges only “retention of employees and office space.”  App. 
10.  That assessment of the facts alleged in the Complaint is 
unduly narrow.  The Amended Complaint in fact alleges that 
essentially all facets of the business at issue, including 
operations, staffing, office space, email addresses, 
employment conditions, and work in progress, remained the 
same after the February 2010 intercession of REMN.  App. 
94–95.  We presently need not speculate as to the technical 
nature of the relationship between the two companies, 
although such evidence may be of great importance upon a 
motion for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Steinbach, 51 F.3d 
at 846 (finding no successor liability where the purported 
successor had only leased the predecessor’s equipment and 
used employees “on a temporary basis”).  For purposes of the 
instant motion we find Thompson’s allegations sufficient to 
demonstrate a plausible “continuity in operations and work 
force.”  Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 178. 
With respect to the second factor, pre-transfer notice of 
the obligation’s existence to REMN, Thompson alleges that 
                                                                                                     
comprehensive analysis [applying the federal common law 
standard to ERISA claims], we need not reinvent the wheel.”  
632 F.3d at 96. 
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Security Atlantic was essentially controlled by a small 
supervisory and managerial group, including Lamparello and 
Chapman, who dictated payroll and scheduling and had 
ongoing knowledge of systematic FLSA violations.  
Thompson contends that when she and her colleagues were 
hired by REMN, the same practices continued under the same 
management, who were eventually integrated into corporate 
leadership roles with REMN.  On these allegations it is 
unclear whether REMN had knowledge of Security Atlantic’s 
allegedly improper overtime practices prior to the transfer.  
And we have no desire to undermine the importance of this 
factor with respect to REMN’s ultimate liability.  As we 
stated in Einhorn, “[t]he requirement of notice and the ability 
of the successor to shield itself during negotiations temper 
concerns that imposing successor liability might discourage 
corporate transactions.”  632 F.3d at 96.  But this factor, like 
others in this case, is not one as to which Thompson should 
be expected to come forward with detailed proof at this stage.  
As to the third factor, the predecessor’s “ability . . . to 
provide adequate relief directly,” defendants have represented 
that Security Atlantic is now “defunct,” which we take to 
mean that it is likely incapable of satisfying any award of 
damages to Thompson.  In total, then, these allegations are 
enough to surmount a motion to dismiss under the federal 
standard.   
We must give separate consideration to Thompson’s 
claims under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. Because 
these claims were cognizable in the District Court only by 
virtue of supplemental jurisdiction, they are governed by the 
New Jersey standard for successor liability.  Even so, 
however, we conclude for the same reasons described above 
that dismissal is not appropriate at this time.  The Amended 
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Complaint describes continuity of operations, management, 
physical location, assets, and general operations.  The 
predecessor corporation, Security Atlantic, went out of 
business shortly after the transfer.  In light of these claims, we 
will not fault Thompson for her inability to make specific 
allegations as to continuity of ownership at this stage, 
particularly given her reasonable assertion that the inner 
workings of the privately held corporations at issue remain 
hidden to her.  She has adequately raised a plausible claim for 
relief on a successor liability theory under the New Jersey 
Wage and Hour Law.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order with respect to Thompson’s claims 
under the FLSA and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law against 
REMN on a theory of successor liability and remand for 
further proceedings. 
D. 
The FLSA imposes individual liability on “any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 203(d).  Aside 
from the corporate entity itself, a company’s owners, officers, 
or supervisory personnel may also constitute “joint 
employers” for purposes of liability under the FLSA.  We 
have addressed that specific topic in the analogous context of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act: 
[A]n individual is subject to 
FMLA liability when he or she 
exercises “supervisory authority 
over the complaining employee 
and was responsible in whole or 
part for the alleged violation” 
while acting in the employer's 
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interest.  Riordan v. Kempiners, 
831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(discussing individual liability 
under the FLSA's analogous 
definition of an “employer”).  As 
the Fifth Circuit explained in 
interpreting the FLSA's analogous 
employer provision, an individual 
supervisor has adequate authority 
over the complaining employee 
when the supervisor 
“independently exercise[s] control 
over the work situation.”  
Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 
F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Donovan v. Sabine 
Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 
(5th Cir. 1983)); see also Falk v. 
Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 
(1973) (holding that a company 
exercising “substantial control of 
the terms and conditions of the 
work” of the employees is an 
employer under the FLSA). 
Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 
F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012).  The focus is on “the totality of 
the circumstances rather than on technical concepts of the 
employment relationship.”  Id. at 418 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Lamparello 
and Chapman “made decisions concerning Security Atlantic’s 
and REMN’s day-to-day operations, hiring, firing, 
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promotions, personnel matters, work schedules, pay policies, 
and compensation.”  App. 93.  When a work or personnel 
issue arose at Security Atlantic that Thompson’s immediate 
supervisor could not address alone, “the supervisor would 
consult with, among others, Chapman or Lamparello.”  Id.  
And in June 2010, when Thompson asked Chapman about 
overtime compensation, he responded that he “did not pay 
overtime to underwriters.”  App. 99. 
Defendants argue that Thompson’s allegations as to 
the workplace roles and responsibilities of Chapman and 
Lamparello are limited and conclusory.  Thompson responds 
that, as a former low-level employee in a privately held 
corporation, she will not have access to the specific facts 
regarding Chapman and Lamparello’s involvement in 
Security Atlantic and REMN until after discovery, and that 
her limited allegations regarding their substantial workplace 
decision-making authority and involvement in day-to-day 
operations are sufficient for purposes of the pleadings.   
We conclude that Thompson provides enough 
information in the Amended Complaint, including allegations 
of the scope of the individual defendants’ workplace authority 
and of specific statements by Chapman as to overtime pay, to 
“allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s 
order with respect to its dismissal of Thompson’s claims 
against Chapman and Lamparello in their individual 
capacities and remand for further proceedings. 
IV. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order of August 31, 2012, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
